Rules and monetary policy by John P. Judd
FRBSF WEEKLY LETTEA
July 7, 1989
Rules and Monetary Policy
In the 1980s, the Federal Reserve compiled a
successful record in combatting inflation. Early
inthedecade, the Fed employed a monetary~
aggregates-oriented procedure to do so. By 1983,
however, deregulation of the financial system
had led to a breakdown in the relationship be-
tween money, economic activity, and inflation.
In response, the Fed deemphasized the monetary
aggregates and has pursued a more discretionary
approach ever since.
Some have argued that the Fed should return to a
more rules-oriented approach to policy, and have
proposed a variety of targets that could serve as
"anchors" for the price level in the place of the
monetary aggregates. These proposals reflect a
belief that the discretionary approach lacks a
long-term guidepost, and that it inevitably will
have an inflationary bias. This Letter examines
this argument and then assesses some substitutes
for targeting the monetary aggregates.
Some definitions
In the context of formulating monetary policy,
a rules-oriented approach represents a commit-
ment on the part of the central bank to meet a
specific and previously announced goal. To be
enforceable, the goal of the rule must be achiev-
able by the central bank, and the public must be
able to observe whether the goal has been met.
An example of such a rule is one that specifies
a constant rate of money growth.
Rules also can be contingent upon the behavior
of prescribed variables. For example, the central
bank could specify in advance how it would re-
spond to movements in certain business-cycle
variables within the context of a longer-run goal
for money growth. Such an approach might be
able to reduce cyclical swings, while keeping
inflation under control over time. However, to
qualify as a rule, the contingent reactions must
be specific enough to allow the public to deter-
mine whether the rule is being followed.
In contrast, when the central bank proceeds in a
discretionary manner, it makes no prior commit-
ments regarding the actions it will take. Instead,
its actions are decided on a period-by-period
basis, allowing it to react in different ways to
different indicators over time.
Time inconsistency
An argument favoring rules was made byecono-
mists Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott about
a decade ago. They argued that discretionary
policy is inferior to a rule because it suffers
from "time inconsistency:' That is, discretionary
policy leads the central bank to take actions that
may enhance welfare in the short run, but result
in higher inflation and diminished welfare in
the long run. Kydland and Prescott showed that
time inconsistency is a problem for discretionary
policies even when the central bank and the
public have the same dislike ofinflation.
In their model, the central bank and public both
are assumed to dislike inflation, and to prefer
higher levels of output and employment to lower
levels. The economy is assumed to operateat
equilibrium, or full-employment, levels of output
and employment over the long run, and to return
to equilibrium following any disturbance to those
variables. These levels are determined by under-
lying factors, such as productivity, labor's choice
between work and leisure, and population
growth.
In this framework, the central bank's discre-
tionary policy actions can raise output above full
employment only temporarily, and then only to
the extent that its actions are not anticipated by
the public. Actions that are fully anticipated will
not raise output even temporarily, but will, in-
stead, cause inflation expectations and nominal
interest rates to rise. Although the central bank's
actions can surprise the public for a while, over
a long period of time, expectations about policy
are assumed to be correct on average.
Given both the public's and the central bank's
preference for higher employment and output,
the central bank may try to increase employment
temporarily, since it may be able to surprise the
public with the sudden change in policy stance.
However, once the public catches on, there willFRBSF
no longer be a benefit from this policy. In fact,
the public's welfare ultimately will be reduced,
since the economy will return to full employ-
ment and the level of inflation inevitably will
rise. The size of the inflationary bias will depend
upon the relative importance attached by the
central bank to low inflation versus high output.
A rule, in contrast, will not have such a bias.
Commitment to a rule eliminates the problem of
time inconsistency since it anchors all decisions
to a long-run goal. This long-run perspective,
moreover, leads the central bank to adopta rule
that is noninflationary, since any other rule would
be unsuccessful over time, as attempts to raise
output above the full-employment level would
not be sustainable and therefore would not
enhance welfare in the long run.
Reputation
Thus, Kydland and Prescott showed that strict
adherence to a rule overcomes the problems
inherent in a purely discretionary approach to
policy. However, it may be possible to overcome
these problems, to a large extent, even when
policy is discretionary. Experience shows that
current policy actions affect the central bank's
reputation; that is, current policy actions influ-
ence expectations concerning future policies.
Consequently, even under a discretionary ap-
proach to policy, thecentral bank may have an
incentive to limit its attempts to raise output
above the full-employment level. For example, a
central bank that is known to have created infla-
tion in the past may find that an expansionary
policy action fairly quickly is met by a rise in
inflation expectations, and a concomitant rise in
long-term·interest rates that mitigates the effects
of the expansionary policy. Such an experience
may deter similar policy actions later on.
Whether concern for reputation can produce
results similar tothose under a rule depends on
the weight placed upon low inflation versus high
output by the central bank. The more weight
placed upon low inflation, the closer is the result
to that under an enforceable rule. Thus, the West
German Bundesbank, which is known to place a
very heavy weight on inflation control, has been
able to maintain very low rates of inflation with-
out a strict rule, whereas a rule could make a
larger contribution to inflationcontrol .in other,
less inflation-conscious countries.
Targets
The decision whether to adopt a rule also de-
pends, in part, on the availability of an adequate
target. In the past, the money supply fit this need.
In this decade, however, the relationship between
money, the aggregate demand for goods and serv-
ices, and inflation has become less reliable,
making a money growth rule inadvisable.
Problems with monetary targeting have turned
attention to the possibility of targeting nominal
income. Many analysts contend that the growth
in real, or inflation-adjusted, GNP has a stable
long-run trend, which they call "potential GNP."
This trend is determined by long-run supply
conditions, including growth in the labor force
and productivity. Although potential GNP growth
may vary somewhat from year to year, most
estimates put its average rate in a range around
2% percent. Thus, as long as nominal GNP is
allowed to grow at around that rate and no faster,
these analysts argue, price stability can be
maintained in the long run.
Maintaining a steady growth rate of nominal
GNP also appears to have desirable automatic
stabilization properties. An unexpected fall in
saving, for example, automatically would elicit
enough policy tightening to bring real GNP back
to its long-run potential rate of growth, leaving
the price level ultimately unaffected.
Unfortunately, a nominal income rule does not
work as well in the face of a supply shock to the
economy, such as a sudden rise in productivity.
Such a shock leads to an increase in potential
GNP, and if the target is not adjusted accord-
ingly, would require an unnecessary decline in
the price level under a nominal income target.
Alternatively, some have proposed that the price
level be targeted directly. A price rule may work
more effectively than nominal income in the face
of a supply shock. This approach also has the
advantage of eliminating the intermediate target
and focussing directly on the ultimate goal of
monetary policy. However, targeting the price
level directly may induce very sharp movements
in real GNP that may not be desirable.
Tactics
Moreover, both proposals suffer from the disad-
vantage that neither nominal income nor pricesare as controllable over a period of a year or so
as are the monetary aggregates. Thus, it would be
difficult for the public to evaluate the central
bank's performance with respect to a nominal-
income or a price rule.
Economist Bennett McCallum has suggested
an approach that overcomes this problem by
establishing a more clearly defined method of
accountability. This rule specifies the change in
the monetary policy instrument (the monetary
base) that the central bank would make in re-
sponse to a given deviation of actual from tar-
geted levels of nominal GNP or prices (with an
adjustment for changes in the trend velocity of
the base).
Such a feedback approach would have the
advantage of defining policy in terms of a con-
trollable instrument, that is, the monetary base.
But the rule is contingent in the sense that the
variable to which policy would respond is nomi-
nal GNP or prices. Such a rule would enable the
public to form expectations based both on the
behavior of a highly controllable instrument and
on deviations of the goal variable from its tar-
geted values.
Evaluation
McCallum has evaluated alternative targets for
monetary policy in testing the effectiveness of
this feedback rule. He tested the robustness of
this rule across four alternative theoretical views
of how the economy works. He found that the
price rule holds the price level constant reason-
ably well,but appears to be somewhat less
robust to model specification than the nominal
income rule. In contrast, the nominal income
rule stabilizes the price level reasonably well
in all cases, and also appears to produce less
volatility in real GNP than does the price rule.
This evidence suggests that nominal income
targeting under a feedback rule could be used
effectively to control inflation, and is to be
preferred somewhat to a price rule. But these
results must be considered preliminary because
they are based upon rudimentary representations
of the four macroeconomic theories tested.
Moreover, such a feedback rule, if strictly
applied, would preclude even occasional adjust-
ments in the course of policy to take account of
changes in the relationship between nominal
income and inflation. Given the experience in
this decade with the breakdown in the money/
nominal-income relationship, commitment to
such a rigid rule may not be prudent.
An alternative approach to nominal income
targeting that does not involve adherence to a
rule per se is one in which the central bank
would adjust the policy instrument (such as the
monetary base or the federal funds rate) in re-
sponse to deviations of a forecast of nominal
GNP from its target. That is, the policy instru-
ment would be adjusted to hold a forecast of
nominal GNP on a target path. If the model's
forecast were correct on average, the nominal
GNP target would be achieved over the long run.
Such a forecasting approach, discussed in this
Letter, July 8, 1988, explicitly takes into account
the lags between policy actions and their effects
on the economy. It provides for a more flexible
policy, since it does not define in advance the
exact actions that will be taken when (observed)
nominal income deviates from target. Under this
approach, however, the central bank's willing-
ness to preserve its reputation for fighting
inflation would need to playa major role in
combatting inflationary biases.
Assuming the central bank places a heavy weight
on inflation control, concern for reputation can
be nearly as effective as strict rules. For example,
highly credible central banks such as the Bank of
Japan and the Bundesbank are able to control
inflation with flexibly implemented targets.
The Fed's credibility appears to have grown as
its record of controlling inflation has lengthened.
Over the past year, for example, this credibility
has been cited as the reason that long-term inter-
est rates have not risen substantially in the face of
sharp increases in short-term rates. This factor
enhances the advantages of a flexibly imple-
mented nominal income target.
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